Isnt it true that Palestinians never had either a state nor any distinct culture or language of their own ?
To thoroughly answer your question, I will divide my answer into Parts.
Palestine and the Palestinians:
The Palestinians are the indigenous people of Palestine; their local roots are deeply embedded in the soil of Palestine and their autochthonous identity and historical heritage long preceded the emergence of a local Palestinian nascent national movement in the late Ottoman period and the advent of Zionist settler‑colonialism before the First World War.
The name Palestine is the most commonly used from the Late Bronze Age (from 1300 BC) onwards. The name is evident in countless histories, ‘Abbasid inscriptions from the province of Jund Filastin (Elad 1992), Islamic numismatic evidence maps (including ‘world maps’ beginning with Classical Antiquity) and Philistine coins from the Iron Age and Antiquity, vast quantities of Umayyad and Abbasid Palestine coins bearing the mint name of Filastin. As we shall see below, the manuscripts of medieval al‑Fustat (old Cairo) Genizah also referred to the Arab Muslim province of Filastin (Gil 1996: 28‒29). From the Late Bronze Age onwards, the names used for the region, such as Djahi, Retenu and Cana’an, all gave way to the name Palestine. Throughout Classical and Late Antiquity – a term used by historians to describe a period between the 3rd and 8th centuries AD, a transitional period from Classical Antiquity to the Middle Ages in the Mediterranean world, Europe and the Near East – the name Palestine remained the most common. Furthermore, in the course of the Roman, Byzantine and Islamic periods the conception and political geography of Palestine acquired official administrative status.
Philistian coin struck in Gaza 4th century BC. reflecting some of local tradition, Arab camel and Arab rider right hand, bow; in left hand, arrow.
ΠΑΛΑΙϹΤΙΝΗϹ Palaestina.
In Arabic: Ilya (Jerusalem) - Filastin , minted in Filastin in 690s AD, Umayyad period, this fals is 2.85 g.
Today the idea of a country is often conflated with the modern concept of ‘nation‑state’, but this was not always the case and countries existed long before nationalism or the creation of metanarratives for the nation‑state. The conception of Palestine as a geo‑political unit and a country (Arabic: bilad or qutr), with evolving boundaries, has developed historically and continues to do so. The identity and cultures of Palestine are living organisms: they change, evolve and develop.
The British occupied Jerusalem in December 1917 and historians often argue that Palestine did not exist as an official administrative unit until the creation of Mandatory Palestine by the British in 1918. Palestine existed as a distinct administrative unit and a formal province for over a millennium. This was first as the joint Roman province of ‘Syria Palaestina’ (135‒390 AD) and subsequently, as a province separate from Syria, in the form of the three administrative provinces of Byzantine Palestine: Palaestina Prima (Палестина Прима), or Palaestina I, Palaestina Secunda (Палестина Секунда) and Palaestina Salutaris or Palaestina Tertia (Палестина Терция). Moreover, these three provinces were effectively governed politically, militarily and religiously from Palaestina Prima as a ‘three‑in‑one’ polity from the 4th century until the early 7th century. And once again Palestine existed as a separate administrative entity in the form of the administrative Arab Muslim province of Jund Filastin. This administrative province of Jund Filastin (Soldiers of Palestine) existed for nearly four and half centuries from the Muslim conquest of Palestine in 637‒638 until the Latin Crusader invasion of 1099 AD.
Political autonomy, independence, and statehood in Palestine over the last three millennia:
Over three millennia from the late Bronze Age and until the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, Palestine enjoyed a great deal of social, political and economic autonomy and also experienced statehood through distinct, though not mutually exclusive, ways – ways which had a profound impact on the evolution of the ideas of Palestine across the millennia:
Autonomous economic and monetary systems and the issuing of Palestinian currency: the institution of independent monetary policies and the minting of distinct Palestinian currency were evident in the cases of the coinage of Philistia or Philisto‑Arabian in the 6th‒4th centuries, and the minting of Arab currency ‘in Filastin’ throughout early Islam.
Imperial patron‒protégé systems: the construction of patron‒client systems and the rise of local and autonomous regional and urban elites in Palestine, as was in the case of the ‘urban notables’ of Ottoman Palestine. But ultimately, these Ottoman urban elites in Palestine were rule‑takers not rule‑makers and rule‑breakers.
Administrative, provincial and military autonomy: this is evident throughout the Roman and Byzantine periods in what became widely known as Provincia Palaestina or the Dux Palaestinae, the ‘military commander of Palestine’, Mutawalli Harb Filastin (Military Governor of Palestine), and in late Ottoman period Palestine with the creation of the autonomous administrative Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem as the key province of Palestine.
Palestinian client states: the emergence and creation of several Palestinian client states, partly based on the same patron‒client relationships. Although the types of client states in Palestine and the degree of their subordination to imperial or powerful states varied significantly, the kings of Philistia throughout much of the Iron Age, the client King Herod the Great under the Romans in the 1st century AD, the Ghassanid tribal Arab federate kings (supreme phylarchs) of Palaestina Secunda, Palaestina Prima and Palaestina Tertia in the 6th and early 7th centuries, and to a lesser extent the autonomous regime of Ahmad Pasha al‑Jazzar in the 18th century were cases in point.
Palestinian practical sovereignty and statehood: this was achieved by Daher al‑‘Umar following his successful rebellion against Ottoman rule in the middle of the 18th century.
Ecclesiastical independence and autocephaly: this was achieved by the Church of Aelia Capitolina and Provincia Palaestina from the mid‑5th century following the Council of Chalcedon.
Seafaring and international trade routes in Palestine and the highly sophisticated urban coastal centres of Philistia (which included Gaza, Ascalon, Ashdod and Jaffa) combined to develop geo‑politically as an integrated south in the course of Iron Age II (c. 1000‒600 BC) and Philistia was the first to develop political autonomy and an autonomous monetary system in Palestine in the form of silver coins, issued in the late 6th, 5th and 4th centuries BC. This local Palestinian currency, known as the coinage of Philistia, was circulated widely in the Philisto‑Arabian region and became known as Philisto‑Arabian coins.
In contrast with the European Zionist settler‑colonial project, which is based on old legends and new Social Darwinism – of ‘iron walls’ and ‘survival of the fittest’, of the appropriation and erasure of indigenous heritage of the country, Palestine and its local heritage have survived across more than three millennia through adaption, fluidity and transformation. The continuities, ruptures, adaption, re‑adaption and metamorphosis of Palestine (from Philistia to Palaestina to Filastin) are also exhibited in the medieval Arabic name Philistin (Filastin), which preserved the Latin Philistina or Philistinus, deriving from ancient Philistia – which gave rise to the Roman administrative name of Provincia Palaestina – in turn based on the ancient name preserved in a variety of ancient languages, the Akkadian (Babylonian) Palastu and Egyptian Parusata/Peleset.
The modern conception of Palestine as a geo‑political unit and a distinct country is deeply rooted in the ancient history, culture and material and intellectual heritage of the land. Already in the course of the Iron Age (1200 to the Assyrian conquest of 712 BC) Philistia evolved not only into a distinct political geography but also as a separate geo‑political entity. This fact would have a long‑term impact on the evolution of the ancient, medieval and modern representations of Palestine.
Palestine as a country (balad or bilad) with a distinct history, physical and cultural geography, evolving boundaries, shifting capital cities (al‑Quds/Aelia Capitolina/Iliya/Jerusalem, Caesarea‑Palaestina, al‑Ramla‑Filastin), regional capitals (Gaza, Tiberias, Scythopolis/ Beisan, Safad, Acre, Nablus) existed for millennia; a country may or may not be a sovereign state; Palestine as a country (like Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, Andalus/Andalusia, Kurdistan, the Basque region, Chechnya or Kashmir) should not be automatically conflated or equated with modern Palestinian nationalism or any modern national representations of the ‘nation‑state of Palestine’.
The culture of Palestine:
Palestinian culture is diverse and complex, influenced by various historical, religious, and political factors. It is deeply rooted in the land of Palestine and its people, who have a rich history dating back thousands of years.
The cultural and linguistic heritage of the Palestinian people is a blend of both indigenous Canaanite, and the Phoenician elements and the foreign cultures that have come to rule the land and its people over the course of thousands of years.
Cultural contributions to the fields of art, literature, music, architecture, costume and cuisine express the Palestinian identity despite the geographical separation between the Palestinians from the Palestinian territories, Palestinian citizens of historic Palestine, now called Israel and Palestinians in the diaspora.
Palestinian culture consists of food, dance, legends, oral history, proverbs, jokes, popular beliefs, customs, and comprising the traditions (including oral traditions) of Palestinian culture.
One of the defining features of Palestinian culture is the emphasis on hospitality and generosity. Palestinian families are known for their warm and welcoming nature, and guests are often treated with great respect and kindness. This tradition of hospitality is deeply ingrained in Palestinian society, and it is seen as a fundamental aspect of their culture.
Another important aspect of Palestinian culture is its cuisine, which is renowned for its unique flavors and use of local ingredients. Palestinian cuisine draws on a range of culinary influences, including Arabic, Mediterranean, and Ottoman cuisine. Popular dishes include hummus, falafel, maqluba (a rice dish with meat and vegetables), and shawarma (grilled meat served in a wrap or pita bread).
Music and dance are also integral parts of Palestinian culture, with traditional forms of music and dance still being performed at weddings, festivals, and other cultural events. Palestinian music is characterized by its rhythmic complexity, and traditional instruments such as the oud and the darbuka are commonly used.
Religion also plays an important role in Palestinian culture, with Islam and Christianity being the two dominant religions. Many Palestinians place great emphasis on their religious faith, and religious holidays and traditions are celebrated throughout the year.
Palestine has been inhabited by various peoples throughout history, and as a result, a wide range of languages have been spoken there with a rich linguistic history, shaped by the many cultures and peoples who have inhabited it over the centuries.
In ancient times, the Canaanite language family was dominant in the region, with languages such as Hebrew, Phoenician, and Amorite being spoken. These languages evolved over time and were influenced by the languages of neighboring peoples, such as Aramaic and Greek. Aramaic became widely spoken during the Persian and Hellenistic periods. Aramaic continued to be spoken in Palestine during the early Islamic period, alongside Greek and Hebrew.
During the Islamic period in the 7th century, Arabic became the dominant language in the region it has evolved over time, influenced by other languages and dialects, such as Turkish and Kurdish during the Ottoman period and it remains the primary language spoken in Palestine today. However, there are also significant minority populations who speak other languages, such as Armenian, Russian, and various dialects of Aramaic, which have been spoken in the region for thousands of years. Palestinian Christians often speak a form of Palestinian Arabic that incorporates Aramaic vocabulary and grammar.
During the British Mandate period (1917-1948), English also became an important language in Palestine, and it continues to be widely spoken today, particularly among educated and professional populations.
The Palestinian dialect of Arabic has evolved over time through a combination of historical, social, economic, and linguistic factors. The region's history of political and cultural diversity, the influence of neighboring languages dialects, such as Aramaic, Hebrew, and Greek, have left their mark on Palestinian Arabic. The dialect continues to evolve and adapt to new linguistic and cultural influences.
Today, the linguistic landscape of the region reflects this complex history, with a diverse range of languages and dialects spoken by the various communities that call Palestine home.
Is Palestine an exception?
For the moment, let's assume that the Palestinian people should not have a country of their own because they never had a state, then why should the peoples of Salvador, Guatemala, Congo, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan... have the right of self-determination?
It should be noted that none of these countries had a state before gaining independence, nor a distinct language or culture that set them apart from their neighbouring states.
In other words, even if it's true that the Palestinian people had neither a state nor a distinct culture or language:
Is that a good reason to confiscate their homes, farms, and businesses?
Is that a good reason to block their return to their homes?
Is that a good reason to nullify their citizenship in the country in which they were born?
Before the development of modern nationalism, loyalty tended to focus on a city or a particular leader. The term “Nationalismus”, translated as nationalism, and coined by Johann Gottfried Herder in the late 1770s, was a modern concept that originated in Europe.
Some nationalists (primordialists)argue that
“the nation was always there, indeed it is part of the natural order, even when it was submerged in the hearts of its members.
The concept of modern statehood posed by the question is a relatively new term that came from the West and cannot be accurately applied to MENA historic wise.
Its implication came after national declarations of independence in the region from western colonial powers mainly in the 20th century.
According to historical facts, Zionism, as an ideology, evolved in response to the rise of Europe's nationalism and anti-Semitism in the late 19th century, especially in Tsarists Russia (Pale States), France during the Dreyfus affair, and Germany after WWI. Most importantly, Theodor Herzl (the founder of Zionism) died thinking Israel will be an Uganda and not in Palestine.
Similarly, Palestinian nationalism evolved in response to the presence of Zionism in Palestine, and most importantly because of the British intention to turn Palestine into a "Jewish National Home," as indicated in the Balfour Declaration.
These central facts were well articulated by David Ben-Gurion (Israel's 1st Prime Minister) and Moshe Sharett (Israel's 1st Foreign Minister) on many occasions.
For example:
As early as 1914, Ben-Gurion admitted the existence of Palestinian nationalism, at least among the working masses. He explained that Palestinians hatred of Zionism was based on their fear of being dispossessed. Ben-Gurion analyzed this hatred and stated:
"This hatred originates with the [Palestinian] Arab workers in Jewish settlements. Like any worker, the [Palestinian] Arab worker detests his taskmaster and exploiter. But because this class conflict overlaps a national difference between farmers and workers, this hatred takes a national form. Indeed, the national overwhelms the class aspect of the conflict in the minds of the [Palestinian] Arab working masses, and inflames an intense hatred toward the Jews."(Shabtai Teveth,pp.18-19).
A few months before the peace conference convened at Versailles in early 1919, Ben Gurion expressed his opinion of future Jewish and Arab relations:
"Everybody sees the problem in the relations between the Jews and the [Palestinian] Arabs. But not everybody sees that there's no solution to it. There is no solution! . . . The conflict between the interests of the Jews and the interests of the [Palestinian] Arabs in Palestine cannot be resolved by sophisms. I don't know any Arabs who would agree to Palestine being ours---even if we learn Arabic . . .and I have no need to learn Arabic. On the other hand, I don't see why 'Mustafa' should learn Hebrew. . . . There's a national question here. We want the country to be ours. The Arabs want the country to be theirs." (One Palestine Complete, p.116).
Many Zionist leaders acknowledged that Zionism was the primary motive behind the evolving Palestinian nationalist movement, however, publicly they always stated that the movement was organized by a few who did not represent the political aims of the ordinary Palestinian. Kalvaryski, a Zionist Official, put it in May 1921:
"It is pointless to consider this [referring to the Palestinian national movement] a question only of effendis [land owners]. . . This may be fine as a tactic, but, between ourselves, we should realize that we have to reckon with an [Palestinian] Arab national movement. We ourselves---our own [movement]---are speeding the development of the [Palestinian] Arab movement."(Righteous Victims,p.104).
In July 1922, after the Palestinian Arab commercial strike, Ben Gurion acknowledged privately that a Palestinian national movement is evolving. He wrote in his diary:
"The success of the [Palestinian] Arabs in organizing the closure of shops shows that we are dealing here with a national movement. For the [Palestinian] Arabs, this is an important education step." (Shabtai Teveth, p.80).
In 1923, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the father of the Israeli political Right wrote of how Palestinians felt about their attachment to Palestine:
"They [Palestinians] look upon Palestine with the same instinctive love and true favor that Aztecs looked upon Mexico or any Sioux looked upon his prairie. Palestine will remain for the Palestinians, not a borderland, but their birthplace, the center, and basis of their own national existence." (Righteous Victims p.36).
Similarly, Ze'ev Jabotinsky also wrote in 1923:
"The [Palestinian] Arabs loved their country as much as the Jews did. Instinctively, they understood Zionist aspirations very well, and their decision to resist them was only natural ..... There was not misunderstanding between Jew and Arab, but a natural conflict. .... No Agreement was possible with the Palestinian Arab; they would accept Zionism only when they found themselves up against an 'iron wall,' when they realize they had no alternative but to accept Jewish settlement."(America And The Founding Of Israel,p.90).
In March 1911, 150 Palestinian notables cabled the Turkish parliament to express their opposition to land sales to Zionist Jews. The governor of Jerusalem, Azmi Bey, responded:
“We are not xenophobes; we welcome all strangers. We are not anti-Semites; we value the economic superiority of the Jews. But no nation, no government could open its arms to groups. . . . aiming to take Palestine from us.”(Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 62.).
In the context of the 1929 disturbance, Ben Gurion spoke of the evolving Palestinian nationalism and the main goal of Zionism (where Palestine's population becomes a "Jewish majority") to the secretariat of the major Zionist groupings. He said:
"The debate as to whether or not an Arab national movement exists is a pointless verbal exercise; the main thing for us is that the movement attracts the masses. We do not regard it as a resurgence movement and its moral worth is dubious. But politically speaking it is a national movement . . . . The Arab must not and cannot be a Zionist. He could never wish the Jews to become a majority. This is the true antagonism between us and the Arabs. We both want to be the majority."(Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p.18)
It should be noted that native Palestinians were constituted the vast majority, and owned most of Palestine. The only way for Zionism to be fulfilled was through the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, as of what occurred.
In 1929, Ben Gurion also wrote about the Palestinian political national movement:
"It is true that the Arab national movement has no positive content. The leaders of the movement are unconcerned with betterment of the people and provision of their essential needs. They do not aid the fellah(Peasant); to the contrary, the leaders suck his blood and exploit the popular awakening for private gain. But we err if we measure the [Palestinian] Arabs and their movement by our standards. Every people is worthy of its national movement. The obvious characteristic of a political movement is that it knows how to mobilize the masses. From this prospective there is no doubt that we are facing a political movement, and we should not underestimate it."
"A national movement mobilizes masses, and that is the main thing. The [Palestinian] Arab is not one of revival, and its moral value is dubious. But in a political sense, this is a national movement." (Shabtai Teveth, p.83)
In the early 1930's, Ben-Gurion finally admitted the mistake of trying to bribe or buy the Palestinian national movement, rather than working with it, he stated in a Mapai forum:
"We have erred for ten years now . . . the crux is not cooperation with the English, but with the [Palestinian] Arabs."
By this, he meant not merely a relationship of friendship and mutual aid, but political cooperation, which he called the "cornerstone" of the "Arab-Jewish-English rule in Palestine. Let's not deceive ourselves and think that when we approach the [Palestinian] Arabs and tell them 'We'll build schools and better your economic conditions,' that we have succeeded. Let's not think that the [Palestinian] Arabs by nature are different from us."
In the heat of the argument, Ben Gurion said to one of his critics and asked:
"Do you think that, by extending economic favors to the [Palestinian] Arabs, you can make them forget their political rights in Palestine?" Did Mapai believe that by aiding the Palestinian Arabs to secure decent housing and grow bumper crops they could persuade the Palestinian Arabs to regard themselves" as complete strangers in the land which is theirs?" (Shabtai Teveth, p.114).
In a book Ben-Gurion published in 1931 (titled: We and Our Neighbors), he admitted that Palestinian Arabs had the same rights as Jews to exist in Palestine. He stated:
"The Arab community in Palestine is an organic, inseparable part of the landscape. It is embedded in the country. The [Palestinian] Arabs work the land, and will remain."
Ben-Gurion even held that the Palestinian Arabs had full rights in Palestine, "since the only right by which a people can claim to possess a land indefinitely is the right conferred by willingness to work." They had the same opportunity to establish that right as the Zionists did. (Shabtai Teveth,p.5-6).
On May 27, 1931, Ben Gurion recognized that the "Arab question" is a:
"Tragic question of fate" that arose only as a consequence of Zionism, and so was a "question of Zionist fulfillment in the light of Arab reality." In other words, this was a Zionist rather than an Arab question, posed to Zionists who were perplexed about how they could fulfill their aspirations in a land already inhabited by a Palestinian Arab majority. (Shabtai Teveth, p.xii, Preface).
As the number of Jews in Palestine (Yishuv) doubled between 1931-1935, the Palestinian people became threatened with being dispossessed and for Jews becoming their masters. The Palestinian political movement was becoming more vocal and organized, which surprised Ben Gurion. In his opinion, the demonstrations represented a "turning point" important enough to warrant Zionist concern. As he told Mapai comrades:
". . . They [referring to Palestinians] showed new power and remarkable discipline. Many of them were killed . . . this time not murderers and rioters, but political demonstrators. Despite the tremendous unrest, the order not to harm Jews was obeyed. This shows exceptional political discipline. There is no doubt that these events will leave a profound imprint on the [Palestinian] Arab movement. This time we have seen a political movement that must evoke the respect of the world. (Shabtai Teveth, p. 126).
For Ben-Gurion as for others, the Palestinians were not a distinct people but merely “Arabs”-the “Arab population’‘or “Arab community" that happened to reside in the country, and he denied their political rights. As a justification, Ben-Gurion stated in 1936:
"There is no conflict between Jewish and Arab nationalism because the Jewish nation is not in Palestine and the Palestinians are not a nation."(Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p. 19).
Ben-Gurion was impressed by Izz al-Din al-Qassam's heroism in the mid-1930s, and he predicted Qassam's example would have a far-reaching effect on the Palestinian national movement. Ben-Gurion stated two weeks after Qassam's fateful battle with the British occupation nearby Ya'bad-Jenin:
"This is the event's importance. We would have educated our youth without Tel-Hai [an encounter with Palestinians in the Galilee in the early 1920s] because we have other important values, but the [Palestinian] Arab organizers have had less to work with. The [Palestinian] Arabs have no respect for any leader. They know that every single one is prepared to sell out the Arab people for his personal gain, and so the Arabs have no self-esteem. Now, for the first time, the [Palestinian] Arabs have seen someone offer his life for the cause. This will give the [Palestinian] Arabs the moral strength which they lack."
Ben-Gurion also stressed that:
"This is not Nashashibi and not the Mufti. This is not the motivation out of career or greed. In Shaykh Qassam, we have a fanatic figure prepared to sacrifice his life in martyrdom. Now there are not one but dozens, hundreds, if not thousands like him. And the Arab people stand behind them." (Shabtai Teveth, p. 126).
After Ben-Gurion's encounter with George Antonius in May 1936, he was willing to concede the existence of a conflict, between the Palestinian Arabs and Jewish nationalism, for the first time in public. He stated:
"There is a conflict, a great conflict." not in the economic but the political realm. "There is a fundamental conflict. We and they want the same thing: We both want Palestine. And that is the fundamental conflict." (Shabtai Teveth, p. 166)
"I now say something which contradicts the theory which once had on this question. At one time, I thought an agreement [with Palestinians] was possible."
Ben-Gurion attached some reservations to this statement. A settlement might be possible between both peoples in the widest sense, between the entire "Jewish people" and the entire Arab people. But such an agreement could be achieved "once they despair of preventing a Jewish Palestine." (Shabtai Teveth,p. 171).
It should be noted that this statement signaled a shift in Ben-Gurion's mindset. Ironically, his conclusion is in complete agreement with Ze'ev Jabotinsky's IRON WALL doctrine. When Jabotinsky first came out with his famous doctrine in the early 1920s, Ben Gurion and many other Zionists in the Labor movement branded him as a "racist". As the previous quote demonstrates, Ben-Gurion finally recognized that Zionism had to rely on the IRON WALL doctrine for it to become a reality.
Unfortunately for the Palestinian people, according to Ben-Gurion that was a matter of "life or death" for Zionism and Jews.
Over no issue was the conflict so severe as the question of immigration:
"Arab leaders see no value in the economic dimension of the country's development, and while they will concede that our immigration has brought material blessings to Palestine [where exclusively Jewish labor was always the rule], they nevertheless contend---and from the [Palestinian] Arab point of view, they are right—that they want neither the honey nor the bee sting." (Shabtai Teveth, p.166).
In 1936 (soon after the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada/Great Palestinian revolt, not to be confused with the 1st intifada that started in 1987), Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary:
"The [Palestinian] Arabs fear of our power is intensifying, [Palestinian Arabs] see exactly the opposite of what we see. It doesn't matter whether or not their view is correct.... They see [Jewish] immigration on a giant scale .... they see the Jews fortify themselves economically .. They see the best lands passing into our hands. They see England identify with Zionism. ..... [Palestinian Arabs are] fighting dispossession ... The fear is not of losing the land, but of losing the homeland of the Arab people, which others want to turn into the homeland of the Jewish people. There is a fundamental conflict. We and they want the same thing: We both want Palestine ..... By our very presence and progress here, [we] have matured the [Arab] movement." (Righteous Victims, p. 136).
He also stated in a meeting with his Mapai party:
" .... the [Palestinian Arabs] fear is not of losing land, but of losing the homeland of the Arab people, which others want to turn into the homeland of the Jewish people. The [Palestinian] Arab is fighting a war that cannot be ignored. He goes out on strike, he is killed, he makes great sacrifices." (Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p. 18).
-In 1936, Moshe Sharett spoke in a similar vein:
"Fear is the main factor in [Palestinian] Arab politics. . . . There is no Arab who is not harmed by Jews' entry into Palestine."(Righteous Victims, p.136).
As the first Intifada erupted/Palestinian Arab revolt in 1936, many Zionists complained that the British Mandate was not doing enough to stop Palestinian resistance (which often was referred to by "terror"). In that regard, Ben-Gurion argued:
"No government in the world can prevent individual terror. . . when a people is fighting for its land, it is not easy to prevent such acts."
Nor did he criticize the so-called British display of leniency:
"I see why the government feels the need to show leniency towards the [Palestinian] Arabs . . . it is not easy to suppress a popular movement strictly by the use of force." (Shabtai Teveth, p. 166).
The leniency of British colonialism Ben-Gurion talked about, paved the way for the rise and dominion of Zionist settler colonialism.
Of all the services Britain provided to the Zionist movement before 1939, perhaps the most valuable was the armed suppression of Palestinian resistance in the form of the revolt. The bloody war waged against the country’s majority, which left 10 percent of the adult male Arab population killed, wounded, imprisoned, or exiled, (Walid Khalidi, From haven to conquest), was the best illustration of the unvarnished truths uttered by Jabotinsky about the necessity of the use of force for the Zionist project to succeed. To quash the uprising, the British Empire brought in two additional divisions of troops, squadrons of bombers, and all the paraphernalia of repression that it had perfected over many decades of colonial wars.(The banality of brutality: British armed forces and the repression of the Arab revolt in Palestine,1936-39).
The refinements of callousness and cruelty employed went well beyond summary executions. For possession of a single bullet, Shaykh Farhan al-Sa‘di, an eighty-one-year-old rebel leader, was put to death in 1937. Under the martial law in force at the time, that single bullet was sufficient to merit capital punishment, particularly for an accomplished guerrilla fighter like al-Sa‘di. (The Palestinian people, A History,p.119).
Well over a hundred such sentences of execution were handed down after summary trials by military tribunals, with many more Palestinians executed on the spot by British troops.(One Palestine complete,pp.492-32).
Infuriated by rebels ambushing their convoys and blowing up their trains, the British resorted to tying Palestinian prisoners to the front of armored cars and locomotives to prevent rebel attack, a tactic they had pioneered in a futile effort to crush resistance of the Irish during their war of independence from 1919 to 1921 by using them as human shields.(One Palestine complete,425-26).
Collective punishment and demolition of the homes of imprisoned or executed rebels, or of presumed rebels or their relatives, was routine, another tactic borrowed from the British playbook developed in Ireland. Two other imperial practices employed extensively in repressing the Palestinians were the detention of thousands without trial and the exile of troublesome leaders. Some were confined, generally without trial, in more than a dozen of what the British themselves called “concentration camps,” most notably that in Sarafand.
IN SPITE OF the sacrifices made—which can be gauged from the very large numbers of Palestinians who were killed, wounded, jailed, or exiled—and the revolt’s momentary success, the consequences for the Palestinians were almost entirely negative. The savage British repression, the death and exile of so many leaders, and the conflict within their ranks left the Palestinians divided, without direction, and with their economy debilitated by the time the revolt was crushed in the summer of 1939. This put the Palestinians in a very weak position to confront the now invigorated Zionist movement, which had gone from strength to strength during the revolt, obtaining lavish amounts of arms and extensive training from the British to help them suppress the uprising.(For details on how sweeping the collaboration was between the British and the Zionists during the revolt, see Segev, One Palestine Complete,381,426-32).
The official Israeli narrative or foundational mythology refuses to allow the Palestinians even a modicum of moral right to resist the Jewish colonization of their homeland that began in 1882. From the very beginning, Palestinian resistance was depicted as motivated by hate for Jews. It was accused of promoting a protean anti-Semitic campaign of terror that began when the first settlers arrived and continued until the creation of the state of Israel.
Zionist leaders referred to Palestinian nationalism, especially as of the mid-1930s during the Palestinian Arab revolt, as German Nazism. Thus Yitzhak Tabenkin, one of the most important Labor leaders of the Yishuv and a leading ideologue of the kibbutz movement, described the Palestinian national movement in his May Day speech of 1936 as a “Nazi” movement, with which there was no possibility of compromise.(Yitzhak Tabenkin, Deuarim [Speeches], Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: 1972), p.264.)
A few months later. Berl Katznelson, one of the three most important Labor leaders of the Yishuv (along with Ben-Gurion and Tabenkin) referred to Palestinian nationalism in a speech to Mapai members as “Nazism,” and spoke of “typical Arab bloodlust.("Berl Katznelson, “Self-restraint and Defense,” a speech dated 28 August 1936, in Ketauim [Writings], Vol. 8 (Tel Aviv: 1948), pp.209-26.).
On another occasion, in January 1937, he spoke of “Arab fascism and imperialism and Arab Hitlerism.“ (A speech at the Mapai Council, Haifa, 23 January 1937, cited in Gorny, Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-/948, p.253.).
In February 1937, Ben Gurion was on the brink of a far-reaching conclusion, that the Arabs of Palestine were a separate people, distinct from other Arabs and deserving of self-determination. He stated:
"The right which the Arabs in Palestine have is one due to the inhabitants of any country . . . because they live here, and not because they are Arabs . . . The Arab inhabitants of Palestine should enjoy all the rights of citizens and all political rights, not only as individuals but as a national community, just like the Jews."(Shabtai Teveth, p.170).
Peculiarly, Ben-Gurion empathized with the Palestinian people. He stated in a letter to Moshe Sharett in 1937:
"Were I an Arab, and Arab with nationalist political consciousness . . . I would rise up against an immigration liable in the future to hand the country and all of its [Palestinian] Arab inhabitants over to Jewish rule. What [Palestinian] Arab cannot do his math and understand what [Jewish] immigration at the rate of 60,000 a year means a Jewish state in all of Palestine." (Shabtai Teveth, p.171-172).
In 1938, Ben-Gurion also stated against the backdrop of the First Palestinian Intifada:
"When we say that the Arabs are the aggressors and we defend ourselves ---- that is ONLY half the truth. As regards our security and life we defend ourselves. . . . But the fighting is only one aspect of the conflict, which is in its essence a political one. And politically we are the aggressors and they defend themselves."(Righteous Victims, p.652).
So if the causes of Zionism had not risen, meaning European anti-Semitism, then Palestinian nationalism probably might not have evolved into what it is today. Everything drastically changed when Britain intended to turn Palestine into a "Jewish National Home" based on the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which states:
Foreign Office
2nd November 1917
Dear Lord Rothschild: I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of our sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour
Britain, as an imperial power, was, in a sense, the sponsor of Zionist aspirations. Britain felt empowered to bestow the Jews right to a national home in Palestine without the approval of an Arab entity or representation of Palestinians living in Palestine. This declaration, which was made to the Zionist Movement in 1917, signaled the futuredispossession and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people because it did not address their political rights. On the other hand, the declaration recognized the political rights of the "Jewish people" around the world, despite the fact that the Jews in Palestine were under 8% of the total population as of 1914. (Righteous Victims, p.83).
In that respect, Lord Balfour, who was the British Foreign Secretary and a self-professed Christian Zionist, stated in 1919:
"Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-old traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder importance than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 [Palestinian] Arabs who now inhabit the ancient land."(Righteous Victims, p.75)
Ironically, Zionists did not feel particularly grateful or beholden to Britain. Ze’ev Jabotinsky and the revisionist movement felt betrayed by Britain when, in 1922 as part of a special article included in the British Mandate it formally barred Jews from settling in Transjordan.
The question that begs to be posed is by what right did the British gave Palestine to the Zionist movement ?!
In response to this declaration, the Palestinian people started to collectively oppose the British Mandate, Jewish immigration, and land sales to the Zionist movement.
Rather than dealing directly with the issues, sadly many Israelis and Zionists have chosen to ignore the existence of the Palestinians as a people. It should be emphasized that the hawk of all Israeli hawks, Ariel Sharon, has accepted the existence of a Palestinian state, in principle, in a portion of historic Palestine. Whether Israelis and Zionists like it or not, Palestine now exists as a state, a postal code, international calling code, internet domain name, ...etc. In the heart of "Eretz Yisrael". Over 13.5 million Palestinians are not going to vanish from the world, and the sooner Israelis and Zionists understand this simple message, the faster they shall start dealing with core issues of the conflict in a pragmatic way.
Finally, applying such logic is very dangerous since it would eliminate half United Nations' members overnight. This concocted myth was employed in all Zionist sectors to suppress the historical, political, economic, and civil rights of the indigenous Palestinian people by claiming that they never previously had a state, distinct language, and distinct culture. Ironically, the Zionist movement has been encouraging Jews from all corners of the world to emigrate to "Eretz Yisrael", so that there is no real common denominator between all of these immigrants such as a common language, culture, country of origin, or even a unified interpretation of "who is a Jew?".