What is the reason for the conflict between Lebanon Hezbollah and Israel Is it related to land disputes from after World War II ?
To shift public attention away from the freeing of Israeli captives and the gencoidal war in Gaza, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu deemed a war against Lebanon to be the optimal strategy.
The detonation of pagers and radio devices around Lebanon initiated the escalation, which has so far been successful for Israel in this context.
The matter of the captives has been excluded from the public discourse in Israel, while it remains uncertain how this escalation will facilitate their return or that of the citizens of the north to their homes. Furthermore, the military's extensive bombardment of Lebanon has aligned Netanyahu more closely with the army.
The Israeli defense philosophy has relied on "deterrence" for decades. Over the past 15 years, Israel's strategy towards Hamas has been to respond forcefully whenever the Palestinian movement disrupts Israel's established status quo.
The Hamas-led attack on Israeli colonies on 7 October, during which Palestinian fighters breached Israeli defenses in three hours, significantly compromised the deterrence.
Currently in Lebanon, this narrative has resurfaced: striking here is perceived as a method for Israel to restore its deterrence, with Netanyahu and the military in agreement on this matter.
Netanyahu is credited with the recent achievements of the Israeli military in Lebanon, including the pager explosions, the elimination of numerous high-ranking Hezbollah officials, and the extensive bombardment of southern and eastern Lebanon.
Consequently, the premier's reputation as a forward-looking leader who resists pressure from both the military and the Americans has been reinforced. The view in Israel is that the nation has reinstated its deterrence in the Middle East, very much thanks to Netanyahu.
The assaults on Lebanon get widespread backing in Israel, encompassing not only Netanyahu's followers but also the military establishment and the center-left opposition.
Yair Lapid, the opposition leader; Benny Gantz, Netanyahu's former ally in the war cabinet; and Yair Golan, chairman of the Zionist left-wing Democrats party, have all endorsed these actions.
The Zionist center-left has consistently been shaped by the military's stances, and presently, as the military and Netanyahu collaborate, it embraces the premise that reinstating Israel's deterrence is necessary.
The center-left lacks a strategy for a political settlement with the Palestinians and only wants "calm," believing this can be attained through deterrence against Hezbollah.
However, it appears that a ground invasion in southern Lebanon to displace Hezbollah's elite Radwan Force beyond the Litani River may not align with Israel's current objectives.
Netanyahu and the military aim to compel Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire in Lebanon, relinquishing its support for Palestinians in Gaza without deploying ground forces into Lebanon.
Following the ground invasion of Gaza in late October, Palestinian fighters have reportedly killed over 350 Israeli soldiers and injured thousands, as per the Israeli military's claims. Securing territory in southern Lebanon may incur a significantly greater toll in soldiers, given the region's more complex geography and Hezbollah's superior armament compared to Hamas.
Invading Lebanon would likely entangle Israel in a protracted conflict, which undermines the principle of deterrence that posits aerial bombardment can substitute for ground operations.
Furthermore, although the Gaza Strip lacks international recognition as a sovereign state, an invasion into Lebanon would constitute an invasion of a sovereign state, posing a heightened risk of provoking a regional conflict.
Countries like Iran, Syria, and Iraq, as well as possibly other Arab nations, may feel compelled to respond if Israel invades an Arab sovereign state. Consequently, at this juncture, neither Netanyahu nor the military is inclined towards a comprehensive ground invasion of southern Lebanon.
Israel is currently in a state of excitement due to what the Israeli populace perceives as military victories against Hezbollah. Israelis believe that nearly a year into the war, Israel has taken the initiative and reinstated its deterrence in the Middle East.
Iran's diplomatic initiative, exemplified by the meeting between the new Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and Jewish representatives, together with an Israeli scholar in New York, as well as his calculated address at the UN General Assembly, is perceived in Israel as evidence that its deterrence strategy is effective against Tehran.
Nevertheless, an Israeli ground invasion remains possible. Public pressure may start to manifest in this regard. Hundreds of thousands of Israeli colonists are impacted by Hezbollah's missiles, in addition to the 60,000 settlers of the north who have already been evacuated from their homes since October 8 due to cross-border hostilities.
Should Hezbollah continue to launch missiles in spite of Israel's recent extensive assaults, the Israeli government and military might face mounting pressure to send ground forces into Lebanon, as they may view this as the only way to stop Hezbollah's resistance and allow Israeli settlers to return to their northern colonies.
The primary objective of Israel in the latest escalation is to exert pressure on Hezbollah, either through direct military action or indirectly via intermediaries, to achieve a ceasefire deal. By achieving this goal, Israel aims to separate Hezbollah from its ally Hamas.
In this context, pushing the Radwan Force beyond the Litani River and carrying out UN Security Council Resolution 1701 are of secondary importance to Netanyahu. He demands a cessation of hostilities in the north in order to operate freely in the Gaza Strip.
Finally, through this escalation, Netanyahu aims to restore Israel to its status on October 6.
Netanyahu is prepared to acknowledge that Hamas will persist in governing Gaza, albeit diminished following the Israeli invasion and lacking any international legitimacy, as before October 7.
As long as this situation persists, Israel will not be compelled to engage in negotiations for a political agreement with the Palestinians, and obstructing such conversations, much less any peace accord with the Palestinians, has consistently been Netanyahu's objective.
In the north, Netanyahu may portray a ceasefire with Hezbollah as a triumph, even at the expense of Israeli captives' lives in Gaza. Netanyahu's followers have abandoned the pursuit to bring them back alive, and many of those who now go to the streets against Netanyahu with a demand for a “deal now” may settle for a victory over Hezbollah.
The primary issue, which is indeed significant, is that Hezbollah is unprepared for a cease-fire and persists in retaliating to Israel's attacks. The majority of Israelis currently facing Hezbollah's attacks in the north endorse the ongoing Israeli bombardments in Lebanon; yet, should Hezbollah persist in retaliating, public sentiment may swiftly shift as their prospects of returning home diminish.
If Hezbollah extends the range of its missiles, a far greater number of Israelis will be compelled to evacuate their residences, akin to the events of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
The economic situation in Israel is deteriorating. Reports indicate that international rating agencies may further downgrade Israel's credit rating if the war persists and escalates. The Treasury Ministry declared that the growth results are far poorer than anticipated.
International airlines are consecutively canceling flights to Israel, and should the conflict in Lebanon escalate, there is zero chance they will resume.
The prevailing sense of siege in Israel will intensify. Once the current euphoria stemming from the alleged gains in Lebanon dissipates, Netanyahu, the military, and the Israeli populace may find themselves in the same predicament as two weeks ago: engaged in a war that is depleting human and economic resources, devoid of a definitive conclusion, and lacking defined objectives.
Additionally, there is another concern. Netanyahu aims to navigate the US elections in November without securing an agreement in Gaza. The present escalation appears to assure him of this outcome. If the battle with Hezbollah escalates into a regional war, American interests may be jeopardized.
In this context, the Biden administration may feel compelled to exert pressure on Israel to cease hostilities in both Lebanon and Gaza, despite its reluctance to challenge Israel. This is an outcome that Netanyahu will seek to evade.